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Abstract 
Abstract of the thesis titled: 
Essays on Interest Rate Policies and Equilibrium Determinacv 
Submitted by LIN Haizhen 
for the degree of Master of Philosophy in Economics 
at the Chinese University of Hong Kong in June, 2003. 
This thesis is to investigate the effects of interest rate policies on equilibrium 
dynamics. Note that existing work typically ignores physical investment by 
assuming a fixed capital stock. In contrast, we analyze models with a standard 
production economy that includes endogenous investment. The purpose of this 
thesis is to provide a set of benchmark results through further study on several 
flexible price models as well as sticky price models. 
This thesis is divided into three parts, each of which is centered on related 
monetary models. Essay I investigates two types of cash-in-advance (CIA) 
constraints and their different effects on equilibrium dynamics are also discussed. 
Essay II studies a money-in-the-utility (MIUF) model with non-separable leisure 
choice. Essay III extends to monetary models with nominal price rigidities. 
The main results of this thesis can be summarized as follows. For flexible price 
monetary models, endogenous investment stabilizes the economy by ensuring 
equilibrium determinacy under active monetary policy; equilibrium indeterminacy 
may arise under passive monetary, depending on the assumption about how money 
enters the economy. In contrast, for competition-sticky price monetary models, 
active monetary policies destabilize the economy by giving rise to equilibrium 
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Essay I 
Monetary Policy and Equilibrium Dynamics 
in a Cash-in-Advance Economy 
Abstract 
This essay attempts to verify the relationship between interest 
rate feedback rules and equilibrium determinacy in a 
cash-in-advance economy with endogenous investment. We 
examine two specifications of the cash-in-advance (CIA) 
constraints. The first is the CIA constraint where liquidity 
restriction is applied only on consumption and the second is the 
CIA constraint adopted in Stockman (1981) where both 
consumption and investment purchases are subject to a finance 
constraint. For the model where only consumption purchase is 
subject to the CIA constraint, the presence of investment acts as a 
stabilizer by ensuring equilibrium uniqueness in most cases for 
both active and passive interest rate rules. While for the 
extended model, the inclusion of investment purchase in the CIA 
constraint may destabilize the economy by giving rise to 
equilibrium indeterminacy for passive monetary policy. 
1 
1 Introduction 
Recent literature on monetary economics has showed great deal of interest 
in the relationship between interest rate feedback rules and macroeconomic 
stability. The best-known result in this literature is that an equilibrium is 
locally unique if the monetary authority follows an active rule, by responding 
to a one percent point increase in inflation with a more than one percent 
point increase in the nominal interest rate. Passive policy, where a one 
percentage point increase in inflation is met with a less than one percentage 
point increase in the nominal rate, generates equilibrium indeterminacy. i 
This essay is to study the effects of the interest rate feedback rules on 
the dynamics of a cash-in-advance economy. The key assumption for inde-
terminacy in CIA models is that some goods require cash (e.g., consumption 
purchases), while others do not (e.g., leisure). This cash vs. non-cash dis-
tinction produces a wedge of inefficiency in the economy and this wedge is 
determined by the nominal rate of interest. If we assume that the policy 
maker sets the nominal interest rate as a function of an instantaneous rate 
of inflation, the distortionary nominal rate becomes endogenous, so that real 
^ An important exception, based on a productive role for money, is developed in Ben-
habib, J., Schmitt-Grohe S.’ and Uribe, M., (2001a). 
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indeterminacy may arise. Two specifications of the CIA constraints are to be 
examined in our work. One CIA constraint is applied only to consumption 
goods so that nominal interest rate acts as a consumption tax. The other 
CIA constraint includes both consumption and investment purchases where 
the nominal interest rate is equivalent to an income tax. By comparison, we 
aim to find out whether these two kinds of constraints have different effects 
on the equilibrium determinacy. 
The most important feature of this paper is to take endogenous invest-
ment into account. Existing work typically ignores physical investment by 
assuming a fixed capital stock such as Schmit-Grohe and Uribe (2000) and 
Meng (2002). However, it is well known that investment makes up a sig-
nificant fraction of GDP. Dupor (2001) also states the fact that quarterly 
investment is more than four times as volatile as consumption in the post-war 
U.S. and this provides ample motivation for modeling investment for further 
research. 
In this essay, we find that endogenous investment does play an impor-
tant role for equilibrium dynamics. For the basic model where liquidity 
constraint is applied only on consumption purchase, the inclusion of invest-
ment and capital accumulation stabilizes the economy by ensuring equilib-
3 
rium uniqueness in most cases for both active and passive interest rate rules. 
Equilibrium indeterminacy arises only under some extreme cases. However 
for the model with Stockman CIA constraint, active monetary policy gives 
rise to equilibrium uniqueness and passive monetary policy generates equilib-
rium indeterminacy or no equilibrium. In conclusion, the range in which the 
economy is uniquely determined is greatly expanded when the CIA constraint 
is only applied to consumption purchase. Put it another way, the cash-in-
advance constraint for investment purchase may lead to more instability of 
the economy. 
This essay proceeds as follows. Section 2 studies the specification where 
CIA constraint is only applied to the purchase of consumption goods. We 
examine a basic monetary model with a standard production economy that 
includes capital accumulation. Section 3 presents an extended model where 
both consumption and investment purchases are subject to the CIA con-
straint. Section 4 concludes. 
4 
2 A CIA Model with Endogenous Investment 
In this section, we analyze a CIA monetary model where liquidity restriction 
is only applied on consumption purchase. With inclusion of endogenous 
investment, our analysis extends Meng (2002) in that neoclassical invest-
ment is added into the economy^. Through comparison, we show that the 
presence of endogenous investment does make difference in equilibrium dy-
namics. Equilibrium indeterminacy vanishes for active interest rate rules 
and can only arise under some extreme conditions for passive interest rate 
rules. Our main result supports previous research findings that capital, as a 
predetermined variable, can stabilize the economy by largely eliminating the 
possibility of indeterminacy of equilibrium. 
2.1 The Economic Environment 
Households. — The representative household's lifetime utility is given by 
U = / / e-P'dt, 0 < / 5 < l , a > 0 (1.1) 
Jo 1-cr 
2Unlike the previous research, Meng (2002) demonstrates that equilibrium uniqueness 
or indeterminacy depends upon the value of the steady state inflation rate. 
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where p denotes the rate of time preference, q consumption, It leisure. We 
adopt the same utility specification as Meng (2002) to facilitate the com-
parison between these two models. The household is subject to the budget 
constraint and cash-in-advance constraint 
ct + rht + k + k = {Rt - 7rt)bt + f(kt, I - k) - TTtrrit - n (1.2) 
nit > act (1.3) 
where rrit are real cash balances, bt real bonds, kt real capital stock, tt^  the 
inflation rate, f (k t l — k) the income from production, Rt nominal interest 
rate paid on bonds, Tt real lump-sum taxes. Note that a is a positive 
parameter no greater than one and the case for a = 1 corresponds to the 
CIA constraint used in Glower (1967) and Lucas (1980). The household is 
endowed with 1 unit of time and chooses endogenously to have leisure and 
work. We adopt the Cobb-Douglas production function, i.e., f(kt，l — k)= 
— ItY•一\ where 1 — k is the labor supply. 
By defining the household's total real wealth as at = rut + bt + kt and 
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substituting Eq. (1.3) into Eq. (1.2), the two constraints can be merged as 
at = {Rt - 7Tt)at + f{kt, 1 - k) - {Rt _ 7Tt)k — (1 + aRt)ct 一 n (1.4) 
In addition, the household is subject to the no-Ponzi-game condition^ 
l i m e -切丑⑷—叫 2 0 (1.5) 
t—^OO 
The optimality conditions associated with the household's problem are: 
p ( c ? i ” y - �二 、 讽 ) (1 .6) 
Q 
( 1 - ， 作 普 7 ) ( 6 广 (1.7) 
H 丄一 4 
ykr\i - hy-'' = Rt - TTt (1.8) 
Xt = Xt(p + 7Tt-Rt(nt)) (1.9) 
l i m e — 叫 s ) - 7 r ⑷ ] 二 0 (1.10) 
t—*oo 
together with the transversality conditions, where A^  is the costate variable 
^This no-Ponzi-gaine condition prevents the household from engaging in Ponzi games. 
7 
for at. Equilibrium in the goods market requires that 
k = - —ct (1.11) 
Government— Following Leeper (1991) and Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe 
and Uribe (2001a), we assume that monetary policy takes the form of an 
interest-rate feedback rule where the nominal interest rate is set as a function 
of current rate of inflation.4 Specifically, we assume that 
Rt = 懒 (1.12) 
where 功(.）is continuos, differentiable, non-decreasing, and strictly positive. 
We also assume that there exists at least one tt* such that 妙(tt*) = p + tt*. 
The monetary policy is said to be active when (it*) > 1 and passive when 
< 1. 
The budget constraint of the government is given by 
at = (Rt - 7rt)at - nitRt — n (1.13) 
''Note that for the remaining part of this thesis, we shall follow this assumption on the 
interest rate rules. 
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where at denotes the real value of aggregate per capita government liabilities, 
which consists of real balances and bonds. This budget constraint says 
that the change in total government liabilities, df, is equal to interest paid 
on outstanding real liabilities, {Rt — 7Tt)at, minus interest savings from the 
issuance of money, Rtmt, minus tax revenues, r .^ The monetary-fiscal regime 
is assumed to be Ricardian. That is, the monetary-fiscal regime ensures that 
total government liabilities converge to zero in present discounted value for 
all paths of the price level. We thus ensure that Eq. (1.10) is always satisfied. 
2.2 Equilibrium Dynamics 
From Eq. (1.8), k can be solved as a function of kt and tt^  
l = l{kt,7Tt) (1.14) 
where 
4 = (1.15) 
k = (1.16) 
7 ( 7 - 1 ) 7 
9 
Similarly, q can be solved from Eqs. (1.6) (1.7) and (1.14) 
where 
^ + (1.18) 
, (Rt-nt�人 1 
+ 卜 Y ) ” - 知 ( ( 1 . 1 9 ) 
Note that cv < 0 for active monetary policy. 
It is easy to obtain 
k = (1.20) 
Prom Eqs. (1.6) (1.9) (1.14) and (1.17), we have 
1 Bk 




B = ^ > 0 (1.22) 
h - ( )，-i 
7 
产 f + [ " - " - � ] T T V er — 1 ) (二） (1.23) 
Then the system can be described by Eqs. (1.20) and (1.21). Letting 
X = X — X* and linearizing the above two differential equations around the 





4 P [i , 风 "U n 
^12 = ^ ^ ^ ^ ~ - C； 
7 
, B* . 
A21 = —"" 
X* 
A22 = -^12 
X* X* 
" 寺 h “ ( ) i ( 二 ” ] > � 
. = V / ( 7 r * ) - l r 13 7 1 1 - ^ ( 1 - ^ ) ] " 
乂 l-^aR* p [(1 -/3) {1-h aR*) • 
1 1 
The determinant and trace of the Jacobian matrix are given by 
1 — 
det � = ^ — — - — — ^ - A n (1.24) 
traceiA) = ^n + ^ (1 —妙'(兀*)) + 师 - 作 ’ * + 5*c； (1.25) 
X T 
where both An and B* are positive. The sign of det(A) is determined by 
two factors: one is the choice of the monetary policies, the other is x*- If 
det(A) < 0, there is one positive and one negative eigenvalues so that equi-
librium uniqueness arises. If d e t � > 0，the dynamics depends on the 
sign of the trace(yl). In particular, there is equilibrium indeterminacy if 
trace(^) < 0. We undertake a more detailed discussion about the equilib-
rium determinacy for both active and passive interest rate rules as follows. 
We first examine cases for active monetary policy: 
Case 1. When ijj [ t t * ) � 1 and cr ^ 1 (c^  and k are separable when 
a = 1), it is easy to see x* > 0 and det(^) < 0 so that the dynamic system 
is uniquely determined.^ The following proposition summarizes this result. 
PROPOSITION 1.1 Under active monetary policy, if the intertem-
poral elasticity of substitution (the inverse of a) is no larger than one, there 
5 The case of cr = 1 corresponds to a logarithmic utility. 
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exists a unique perfect-foresight equilibrium in which kt and irt converge to 
the steady-state (/c*,7r*). 
Case 2. When i/^'in*) > 1 and a < 1, the two components of x* conflict 
in their signs: the first part is negative and the second is positive. Thus, 
the sign of x* depends on which part may dominate. For the sake of inde-
tenninacy, x* must be negative so that det(yl) > 0. Nevertheless, if x* < 0， 
we have trace(A) > 0 so that no equilibrium exists. 
PROPOSITION 1.2 Under active monetary policy, if the intertempo-
ral elasticity of substitution (the inverse of a) is larger than one, there exists 
equilibrium uniqueness to a large extent. The possibility of equilibrium 
indeterminacy is totally eliminated. 
Note that we draw different results compared to Meng (2002) in that with 
endogenous investment, equilibrium indeterminacy does not exist for active 
monetary policy. In the absence of endogenous investment, however, indeter-
minacy of equilibrium depends on both the magnitude of the intertemporal 
elasticity of substitution and the value of the steady-state inflation rate.® 
In the following part, we study equilibrium dynamics under passive inter-
^'Meng (2002) demonstrates that if the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is less 
than one, for active interest rules, the equilibrium is indeterminate for sufficiently high 
steady state inflation rate. 
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est rate rules. We show that generally there is equilibrium uniqueness and 
indeterminacy can arise only under some extreme conditions. 
Case 3. When < 1 and 0 < a ^ 1, it is easy to see that x* < 0 
and det(yl) < 0. Thus, the equilibrium is saddle-path stable. The following 
proposition summarizes this result. 
PROPOSITION 1.3 Under passive monetary policy, if the intertem-
poral elasticity of substitution (the inverse of a) is no less than one, there 
exists a unique perfect-foresight equilibrium in which kt and tt^  converge to 
the steady-state (k*,7r*). 
Case 4. When ip'{tt*) < 1 and a > 1, the signs of determinant and trace 
are both ambiguous. This case is quite similar to case 2 but is much more 
complicated. In case 2, it is impossible to obtain equilibrium indeterminacy 
since trace{A) is definitely positive when d e t � > 0. Nevertheless, in case 
4, we find that when det(A) > 0，trace{A) can be positive or negative in sign 
depending on different parameterization. Then equilibrium indeterminacy 
may occur in case 4. Numerical calculations also show that there is space 
for equilibrium indeterminacy to arise. For example, when 岭'(tt*) is very 
close to 1 (specifically, when ip'{7T*) = 0.9999 in the case of p = 0.0045, 
7 = 0.3, (3 = 0.7, a = 0.8, tt* = 0, a = 2.5), there exists equilibrium of 
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indeterminacy/ 
PROPOSITION 1.4 Under passive monetary policy, if the intertem-
poral elasticity of substitution (the inverse of a) is less than one, equilibrium 
uniqueness and equilibrium indeterminacy can both occur. However, in-
determinacy may only arise under some extreme conditions. For example 
when ip'in*) is sufficiently close to 1, a continuum of perfect-foresight equi-
libria exist in which kt and nt converge asymptotically to the steady-state. 
To Slim up, for this CIA model with endogenous investment and non-
separable leisure choice, equilibrium uniqueness occurs in most cases irre-
spective of whether the monetary policy is active or negative. Particularly, 
for active monetary policy, equilibrium indeterminacy never occurs, which 
differs from the main findings of Meng (2002) where indeterminacy arises for 
sufficiently high steady-state inflation rate. In this sense, we conclude that 
the presence of endogenous investment acts as a stabilizer and make equilib-
rium uniqueness much more likely. The intuition is quite straightforward. In 
the presented case, the inclusion of capital as a predetermined variable largely 
eliminates the possibility of indeterminacy of equilibrium since it supplies an 
initial condition, which pins down the two-by-two dynamic system. 
7This parameterization follows Dupor (2001). 
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3 An Extended Model with Stockman CIA 
Constraint 
In this section, we investigate another specification of the CIA constraint used 
in Stockman (1981) where liquidity restriction is applied on the purchases of 
both consumption and investment goods. Put it another way, the stockman 
CIA constraint treats consumption and investment symmetrically so that 
an increase in the nominal interest rate discourages both consumption and 
investment. However, for the CIA constraint studied in Section 2’ an increase 
in nominal interest rate performs a directly depressing effect on consumption 
spending and an indirectly promoting effect on investment spending due to 
a relatively higher cost of conducting transactions. Their difference is quite 
distinct and it is quite natural to hypothesize that these two CIA constraints 
may perform different effects on equilibrium determinacy. Our following 
work does support this hypothesis. In contrast to the results obtained in 
Section 2, we show that the equilibrium is determinate for active interest 
rate rules and the possibility of equilibrium indeterminacy is quite high for 
passive interest rate rules. 
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3.1 The Economic Environment 
The representative household's lifetime utility is given by 
rOQ 
U= e-P'u{ct)dt (1.26) 
Jo 
where the instantaneous utility function is assumed to be strictly increasing 
and concave, namely Uc> 0 > Ucc-
The household is subject to the budget constraint and cash-in-advance 
constraint 
Q + rh, + � + ict = {Rt - 7U)bt + f{kt) - 6kt - 兀 她 - 丁 t (1.27) 
mt>ct + k + 5kt (1.28) 
where 6 denotes the depreciation rate. The neoclassical production function 
f{kt) is assumed to be strictly increasing and concave, i.e., fk>0> fkk- By 
defining the household's total non-capital real wealth as at = mt-\- bt and a 
new variable as Q = k^ we obtain 
dt = f(kt) — Skt - TTtat + Rt{at — nit) - - Ct - Tt (1.29) 
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The current-value Hamiltonian is given by 
H = u{ct) + Xt lf{kt) - 6kt - TTtat + Rt(at - mt) - Ct - ^ - ^t] + VtCt 
[mt - C t - C t - ^h] (1.30) 
where At, rjf. and /i^  are all Lagrangian multipliers. 
The optimality conditions associated with the household's problem are 
given by 
u {ct) = Xtfit (1.31) 
rk = \t + l~h (1.32) 
XtRt =叫 (1.33) 
A, = Af [/? + TT, - Rt] (1.34) 
it = prit - f'(h)Xt + At + Sfi, (1.35) 
along with the transversality conditions. In addition, the goods market 
equilibrium condition implies that 
k = f{kt) - 6kt - ct (1.36) 
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3.2 Equilibrium Dynamics 
First, we set qt = —. Eqs. (1.32) and (1.33) define a decreasing function 
Vt 
linking qt and TTt where 
^ - i r k ) (1.37) 
By differentiating the above equation, we obtain 
^ = (1.38) 
qt l + i^int) � ) 
It is easy to calculate from Eqs. (1.34) and (1.35) that 
也=7h + f{kt�qt-5-�{nt) (1.39) 
Qt 
Combining Eqs. (1.37), (1.38), and (1.39)，we obtain a first-order differ-
ential equation describing the equilibrium dynamics of inflation. Finally, the 
dynamic system can be described by the following three equations 
kt = m)-魄-ct (1.40) 
= 八y、"! (1.41) 
U" “ l+V^TTf)-
1 9 
. - f ' i h ) 1 + r �i , “ 0 � 
" 广 覆 — (1.42) 
We now consider perfect-foresight equilibria in which kt, Ct, and tt^  re-
main bounded in a small neighborhood around the steady state {k*, c*, tt*).^  
Letting x = x — x*, the behavior of the system close to the steady state is 
given by 
kt au 一 1 0 kt 
Ct = a2\ 0 a23 Ct (1.43) 
介 t (I31 0 «33 nt 
The elements of the Jacobian matrix are given by 
an = f(k*)-S>0 
fW) 
m書)、„ 
作 * )、 0 
购 1 = — ? ^ 〉 o 
Hn the steady state, p + n* = ^(tt*), f'{k*) = (p + (5)(1 + i^iir*)). 
2 0 
Letting A denotes the Jacobian matrix, the determinant and trace of the 
Jacobian matrix are given by 
d e 刺 二 梨 丨 「 f V ) l (1.44) 
^ ) U � ( C * ) � ' ( T T * ) � ) 
trace{A) =p+(p-^6) [1 + —[丄冗 ) ] [ 1 _ (兀 *)] (1-45) 
It is easy to see that for active monetary policy, det(A) < 0 and trace{A) > 
0. Thus, there are two characteristic roots with positive real parts and one 
root with negative real part. The equilibrium is uniquely determined, 
PROPOSITION 1.5 Under an active monetary policy, there exists a 
unique perfect foresight equilibrium (PFE) in which all variables converge to 
the steady state. 
For passive monetary policy, det(A) > 0，and the sign of trace {A) can be 
positive or negative. If 你、< ft, where ^ = ” (i + 二 ) + “ � … * ) ’ 
we have trace(A) < 0 . In this case, there is one characteristic root with 
positive real part and two characteristic roots with negative real part so that 
equilibrium indeterminacy arises. The following proposition summarizes the 
results. 
PROPOSITION 1.6 Under a passive monetary policy (功'(tt*) < 1): 
2 1 
(a). If 妙'(TT*) > /2, no PFE exist. 
(b). If ^'(tt*) < /i, there exist a continuum of PFE in which all variables 
converge to the steady state. 
To understand the results in proposition 1.6, we consider a specific pa-
rameterization under passive monetary policy. Following Dupor (2001), we 
set p = 0.0045，6 = 0.025, and tt* = 0. It easy to calculate ft = 0.97. That 
means when ip^ TT*) < 0.97，equilibrium indeterminacy can arise. Since the 
value of fi is close to one, it is easy for indeterminacy to occur under passive 
monetary policy. A simple intuition for indeterminacy under passive rules 
follows. If households expect high current inflation, a passive monetary au-
thority responds by lowering the real interest rate. In response, households 
reduce savings and increase desired consumption which leads firms to raise 
prices, thus validating the original inflation expectations. 
4 Conclusion 
To explore the effect of the interest rate feedback rules on the dynamics of the 
economy, this essay examines a CIA economy with the inclusion of neoclassi-
cal investment. We first study the CIA constraint where only consumption 
2 2 
purchase is subject to a transaction constraint. As we have discussed before, 
the presented model extends Meng (2002) by adding endogenous investment 
into the economy. Meng (2002) points out that the value of the steady-
state inflation rate determines whether active interest rate rules can gener-
ate equilibrium uniqueness or indeterminacy. Contrary to Meng (2002)，we 
find that the inclusion of endogenous investment can stabilize the economy 
by ensuring equilibrium uniqueness for active monetary policy. That is to 
say, equilibrium indeterminacy does not exist for active interest rate rules. 
The presence of investment — a predetermined variable with a given initial 
condition - stabilizes the economy by eliminating the possibility of indeter-
minacy. We have also studied the equilibrium dynamics for passive interest 
rate rules and found that both equilibrium uniqueness and indeterminacy can 
occur. However, equilibrium indeterminacy arises only under some extreme 
conditions where the inflation rate should be sufficiently close to one. 
The extended model considers the case where the CIA constraint is ap-
plied on the purchase of both consumption and investment goods. For active 
monetary policy, there exists real determinate; for passive monetary policy, 
there exists either equilibrium indeterminacy or no equilibrium. Moreover, 
the possibility of having equilibrium indeterminacy is quite high. Com-
2 3 
pared to the basic model, it is easy to see that these two CIA constraints do 
perform different effects on the dynamics of the economy. The Stockman 
CIA constraint destabilizes the economy through enhancing the possibility 
of indeterminacy for passive monetary policy. 
Since the presented two CIA models are not fully consistent with each 
other, more verification work needs to be done to test the robustness of our 
result. Our essay also suggests that the assumptions on which purchase is 
subject to finance constraint plays an important role in dynamic analysis, 
and that further research is needed to examine the difference between these 
two CIA constraints. 
There are several aspects one could do to improve our work. For exam-
ple, for the first CIA model with endogenous labor supply, it is interesting 
to study the alternative Stockman CIA constraint so that we could exam-
ine not only the difference between these two CIA constraints but also the 
possible different effects brought by the endogenous leisure choice. This 
extended work would unavoidably require more complicated calculation and 
techniques, but it is worthy of the efforts because it could provide more 
insights into the previous research work. 
2 4 
Essay II 
Investment and Interest Rate Rules in a MIUF 
Model with Non-separable Leisure 
Abstract 
Previous research regarding the effect of interest rate rules on 
equilibrium dynamics is affected by the inclusion of endogenous 
investment. Moreover, different choice of the preference 
functions may bring about quite different results on equilibrium 
determinacy. This paper demonstrates that for a 
money-in-the-utility-ftinction (MIUF) model in which the central 
bank takes a current Taylor rule, equilibrium uniqueness is 
ensured but equilibrium indeterminacy never occurs for both 
active and passive interest rules. This result depends on the 
inclusion of endogenous investment as well as the adoption of a 
specific preference form. We thus arrive at the conclusion that 
even under the same economic environment, preference 
specification may have different effects on the dynamic analysis 
of real determinacy. 
25 
1 Introduction 
Recent developments in monetary economics have paid much attention to the 
relationship between monetary policy and macroeconomic stability. Influen-
tial papers include Leeper (1991), Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000), Schmitt-
Grohe and Uribe (2000), Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2001a). Nev-
ertheless, these papers typically ignore physical investment by assuming a 
fixed capital stock. For example, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2000) study a 
flexible-price environment in which the fiscal authority follows a balanced-
budget requirement and the central bank follows Taylor interest rate rules. 
They conclude that in case of a current Taylor rule, there is real determi-
nacy for a range of r between 1 and some upper bound, where r is the 
elasticity in which the nominal interest rate responds to movements in in-
flation.^ However, their results are based on a labor-only cash-in-advance 
economy. Another example is Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2001a). 
They examine a flexible-price continuous-time MIUF endowment economy 
and demonstrate that the sign of the cross-partial is critical to whether or 
^ A current interest rate rule means that the central bank responds to movements of 
the current inflation rate. They also examine a forward-looking Taylor rule in which the 
central bank responds to expected inflation and find there is equilibrium determinacy if 
T < 1. 
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not there is indeterminacy. They find that active monetary policies are in-
determinate if Ucm < 0 and determinate if Ucm > 0. Their results are also 
derived from assuming a fixed amount of capital stock. 
Some efforts have been made to add endogenous investment into economic 
models such as Carlstorm and Fuerst (2001), Dupor (2001), and Meng and 
Yip (2003). The motivation behind is that investment is an important com-
ponent of GDP and it is much more volatile than consumption.^ One main 
finding of Carlstorm and Fuerst (2001) is that the inclusion of investment 
and capital accumulation tightens up the determinacy regions so that they 
are essentially independent of labor supply and money demand elasticities. 
Similarly, through incorporating neoclassical investment in the money-in-the-
utility-function model with flexible prices, Meng and Yip (2003) has shown 
that with inelastic labor supply, equilibrium uniqueness is ensured for both 
active and passive monetary policies. Particular interest lies in their find-
ings that with endogenous labor supply, for the case of non-separable leisure, 
there exists equilibrium indeterminacy for both active and passive mone-
tary policies. In this essay, we challenge this result by adopting another 
preference specification with non-separable leisure choice. Contrary to the 
•2 Refer to page 107 of Dupor (2001) for more detailed information on this point. 
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results obtained by Meng and Yip (2003), with neoclassical investment and 
non-separable leisure choice, indeterminacy occurs under no circumstance 
for both active and passive interest rules. Based on our work, we arrive 
at the conclusion that even under the identical economic environments, real 
determinacy may differ on the premise of different preference specifications. 
The essay is organized as follows. Section 2 analyzes the MIUF model 
with non-separable leisure choice and main results are presented. Section 3 
makes the conclusion. 
2 A MIUF Model with Non-Separable Leisure 
2.1 The Economic Environment 
Households. — The representative household's lifetime utility is given by 
厂 [ 構 成 ( 2 1 ) 
Jo 1 - cr 
where p denotes the rate of time preference, q consumption, rrit real money-
balance, It labor. The household is endowed with 1 unit of time and chooses 
endogenously to have leisure and work. 
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The household holds money, physical capital and nominal bonds. The 
nominal bonds pay the nominal interest rate Rt > 0. The household is 
subject to the budget constraint 
Q + rhf + � + kt = (Rt — 7Tt)bt + /("、，k) - Thm - 丁t (2.2) 
where bt denotes bond, kt the physical capital, iTt the inflation rate, 丁t real 
lump-sum taxes. We adopt the Cobb-Douglas production function so that 
f{kt,lt) = 0 < 6> < 1. By defining the household's total real wealth 
as at = nit + + kt, the budget constraint can be written as 
a = {Rt - 7rt)at + /cf/；"^  - (Rt - nt)h — Rtm -Ct — Tt (2.3) 
The optimality conditions associated with the household's utility mcod-
mization problem are: 
- [ c>f(l - / J — " 广 二 \ (2.4) 
Ct 
-^[c>f(l - y i - 叩 = X t R t (2.5) 
nit 
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— yi--冷]i-a = A.(l — (2.6) 
丄—G H 
Rt —沉t =崎Y-i (2.7) 
Xt = {p + Trt-Rt)\t (2.8) 
lime-.(o'l尺'⑷-冗⑷] t = 0 (2.9) 
together with the transversality conditions, where Xt is the costate variable 
associated with at. In addition, we have the following goods market equilib-
rium condition 
kt = kfll-^ - ct (2.10) 
Government- Monetary policy takes the form of an interest-rate feed-
back rule. Specifically, we assume that 
Rt = (2.11) 
where (/?(•) is continuos, differentiable, non-decreasing and strictly positive. 
We assume that there is at least one tt* such that (p{7T*) 二 p + tt*. The 
monetary policy is said to be active when {tt*) > 1 and passive when 
(p'iir*) < 1. 
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The budget constraint of the government is given by 
Tilt + k = {Rt -兀 t ) k - TTtmt - Tt ( 2 . 1 2 ) 
The monetary-fiscal regime is assumed to be Ricardian. That is, the monetary-
fiscal regime ensures that total government liabilities converge to zero in 
present discounted value for all paths of the price level. We thus can ensure 
that Eq. (2.9) is always satisfied. 
2.2 Equilibrium and Local Dynamics 
First, It can be solved as a function of kt and nt from Eq. (2.7)，i.e., 
lt = Kkunt) (2.13) 
Then, q can also be solved as a function of kt and k from Eqs. (2.4) and 
(2.6) 
Ct = c(ktJt) = c{kt,Tit) (2.14) 
where 
- 结 _ 
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= 1 “ 1 -、] (2.16) 
Similarly, from Eqs. (2.4) and (2.5), nit can be expressed as a function of q 
and nt 
nit = rn(ct,7rt) = m{kt,7Tt) (2.17) 
Substitute Eqs. (2.13) (2.14) and (2.17) into Eqs. (2.4), take logs and 
differentiate with respect to time, we obtain the first-order equation describ-
ing the equilibrium dynamics of inflation. Together with the goods market 
equilibrium condition, we obtain the dynamic equation system in terms of kt 
and 7Tt 
k = (2.18) 
. = ( … 广 船 “ / c (2.19) 
X 
删 X = ^ ( 1 —叫双—  ) 瓦 ~ — 
Linearizing the above two equations around the steady state (/c*,7r*), the 
elements of the Jacobian matrix A are listed as follows^ 
3At the steady state, R* - tt* = p, k* = , , , ~ ~ a n d c* = 
[1 — a — p) + a ( l — U) 
{1 - a - 13) + a{l - 6)' 
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[ l _ a _ / 3 + a(l— 州 p � , 
= { l - a - P ) 9 � 0 
一 0(1-a-(3) 
仍 = + 9(1-a- } 
* (if' - 1)^1 — (a + m — g)] I aaj^' - 1) /3(1 - a)cp' 
whereX = ( T I T ^ + _ « - " p-^n* 
The determinant and trace of the Jacobian matrix A are given by 
det(A) = (1 ~ 仏 (2.20) 
X 
亡race(⑷=/i + - ^ { 1 + (2-21) 
We examine that x* affects both det(A) and trace{A). It can be shown that 
li ip < I and 0 < a ^ 1, we have x* < 0; and when cp'�1 and <7 > 1, 
we have x* > 0. Under these two conditions, det(A) is definitely negative, 
which guarantees one positive and one negative eigenvalues. For the above 
two cases, there is a unique equilibrium saddle path that converges to the 
steady state. Note that this result coincides with the result we obtained 
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in Essay I for the basic CIA monetary m o d e l . T h e following proposition 
summarizes our results. 
PROPOSITION 2.1 For a MIUF model with non-separable leisure 
choice, there is a only perfect foresight equilibrium in which all the variables 
converge to the steady state under the following two conditions 
(a) active interest rate rules ((/?' > 1) and <7^1 
(b) passive interest rate rules ((/?' < 1) and 0 < cr ^ 1. 
The remaining two cases are also examined, we notice that the steady-
state inflation rate may affect the equilibrium dynamics. For passive interest 
rate rules and a > 1, if tt*�元，X* is negative so that there is equilibrium 
uniqueness; if tt* < 开，x* i s positive so that no equilibrium exists, where 
元 二 /^ (l - . (2 22) 
{ip' -l)eil-(a a)] aa{ip' - 1 ) 、 . 乂 
il-9)p + p(l — a - 約 
Symmetrically, for active interest rate rules and a < 1, if tt* > 7f, there 
exists equilibrium uniqueness; if tt* < 亓’ there exists non-solution. These 
results can be highlighted as follows 
PROPOSITION 2.2 For active interest rate rules and cr < 1, or for 
'It is well known that CIA model, to some extent, can be viewed as a special case of 
MIUF model. 
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passive interest rate rules and a > 1, 
(a) if TT* > 开，there is equilibrium uniqueness; 
(b) if TT* < 7f, there exists no equilibrium. 
It is quite interesting that equilibrium indeterminacy vanishes in our 
model. Notice that the necessary and sufficient condition to obtain in-
determinacy is det(/l) > 0 and trace(A) < 0. But this condition can never 
be fulfilled. The reason is that to ensure det(yl) > 0 (the necessary condition 
for indeterminacy), — m u s t be positive, which causes trace{A) to be 
X 
positive at the same time. That means non-solution but no indeterminacy 
will arise. In conclusion, indeterminacy will be impossible. 
Numerical examples for the value of 元 can be obtained after a specific 
parameterization such os p = 0.0045, a = (3 = 0.3，6 — 0.3.5 For the case of 
active interest rate rules, by assuming = 1.5 and cr = 0.1, we can calculate 
for 7f « 9%. That is if tt* > 9%, we get equilibrium uniqueness and if 
TT* < 9%, the economy is over determined. 
For the presented MIUF model, the value of the steady-state inflation 
rate will determine whether there is equilibrium determinate or non-solution. 
Similar results on the important role of the steady-state inflation rate can 
'''We follow Dupor (2001) to demonstrate an annual 1.8 percent discount rate and d is 
the capital's share. 
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also be found in Meng (2002), which demonstrates that an active interest 
rate rule renders equilibrium indeterminate if the steady state inflation rate 
is sufficiently high, and ensures equilibrium uniqueness if it is sufficiently low. 
Our model can be regarded as the MIUF counterpart of the CIA model in 
Meng (2002), The inclusion of investment in our model acts as a stabilizer 
and eliminates the possibility of equilibrium indeterminacy. 
3 Conclusion 
This essay appends investment spending to a MIUF model with non-separable 
leisure choice. Related research can be found in Meng and Yip (2003) where 
a counterpart model is examined. By adopting a different preference form, 
we have obtained different results regarding equilibrium determinacy. In our 
model, the presence of endogenous investment totally eliminates the possi-
bility of equilibrium indeterminacy. However, in their model, Meng and Yip 
(2003) reports that by virtue of some specific parameterization, real indeter-
minacy arises under both active and passive monetary policies. Our work 
6 Besides the inclusion of investment and capital accumulation, another difference is 
that our model is a "cash-when-I'm-done" model where money is at the end of the period 
to facilitate trade. However, in Meng (2002), money is held at the beginning of the period 
where cash is used to realize the purchase of consumption goods. 
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can be regarded as one more attempt made to verify how interest rate rules 
affect production through its interaction with labor supply. But our result 
is subject to our preference specification and is sensitive to other preference 
choices. In this sense, extension work or further research can be done to 
investigate more general utility functions. 
Another possible extension of this essay is to explore the alternative in-
terest rate rules. Our analyses focus only on current Taylor rules in which 
the policy maker sets the nominal interest rate as a function of the instanta-
neous rate of inflation. More practical work is to study a backward-looking 
Taylor rule where the central bank responds to the past inflation rates or 
a forward-looking where the central bank responds to expected future in-
flation rates. Fruitful results regarding equilibrium determinacy have been 
obtained from considering these three alternative Taylor rules such as Ben-
habib, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2001a) and Carlstorm and Fuerst (2001)/ 
Thus, it is desirable for future research to take into account the other two 
types of Taylor rules. 
7 Note that Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2001a) study a labor-only economy. 
Carlstorm and Fuerst (2001) take endogenous investment into account and focus their 
research on a CIA model. 
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Essay III 
Investment and Interest Rate Rules in Sticky 
Price Models 
Abstract 
By appending endogenous investment into a sticky price model 
with productive money, active interest rate rules generate either 
equilibrium indeterminacy or no equilibrium, which is consistent 
with the previous study of the sticky price models such as Dupor 
(2001). However, the case for passive interest rules is quite 
different in that it gives rise to not only equilibrium uniqueness 
but also equilibrium indeterminacy. Our result is also robust to 
an extended model with non-separable leisure choice. In 
conclusion, we demonstrate that the way in which money is 




In the previous two essays, we have analyzed economies with flexible prices. 
It is quite natural to ask if our results will be affected by the presence of 
nominal rigidities. Some papers have recently attempted to answer this 
question by examining sticky price models. For example, Glarida, Gali, and 
Gertler (2000) and Kerr and King (1996) report that active monetary policy-
generates equilibrium determinacy in reduced-form sticky price models. An 
important exception can be found in Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe 
(2001a) where they study a productive-money economy and conclude that 
active interest rate rules may give rise to either equilibrium uniqueness or 
indeterminacy. Similar results can also be found in Benhabib, Schmitt-
Grohe and Uribe(2001b) where a basic MIUF model with separable labor 
supply is examined. But these sticky price models have all ignored the role 
of investment spending because they are either labor-only or money-only 
production economies. Therefore, in this essay, endogenous investment is to 
be added into the sticky price models to investigate the effect of interest rate 
policies on the dynamics of the economy. 
Obviously, we are not the first to make such an attempt. Dupor (2001) 
finds that, by appending endogenous investment to a benchmark imperfect 
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competition-sticky price model, a passive interest rate rule implies local equi-
librium uniqueness, whereas an active rule generates equilibrium indetermi-
nacy or non-solution. We aim to examine whether Dupor's results are robust 
to other specifications of utility function. As Benhabib, Schinitt-Grohe and 
Uribe (2001a) has pointed out that the way in which money is assumed to 
enter preference and technology is critical for the dynamic analysis, we fur-
ther previous study by examining two alternative MIUF models. Our main 
findings can be summarized as follows. For active interest rules, the equi-
librium is either indeterminate or overdetermined, which verifies the results 
obtained by Diipor (2001). For passive interest rules, by contrast to Dupor 
(2001), we find that not only equilibrium determinacy but also equilibrium 
indeterminacy may arise. 
This essay is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce productive 
money into the economy as emphasized by Benhabib et al. (2001a). Section 
3 studies an alternative model with endogenous labor supply. The last 
section concludes. 
4 0 
2 Productive Money and Investment in a Sticky 
Price Model 
2.1 The Economic Environment 
Household-Firm Problem 
In this section, money is productive in the sense that it enters the neoclas-
sical production function as a factor input. For this purpose we separate real 
money balances into two parts: productive money (m^) and nonproductive 
money (??严) .The economy is assumed to be populated by a continuum of 
household-firm units, each of which produces a differentiated good y. The 
demand faced by each firm is 
y = (3.1) 
where P is the price that household-firm charges for its good, P is the 
economy-wide price level and Y^ is aggregate output.i The function d(.) 
is assumed to be twice continuously differentiable, increasing and satisfying 
I Such a demand function can be derived by assuming that households have preferences 
over a composite good that is produced from differentiated goods via a Dixit-Stiglitz 
production function. 
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that d{l) = 1 and d'(l) < -I? The household-firm's production function is 
given by 
y = f{krrf) (3.2) 
where k denotes capital hired by the household-firm, m^ is the productive 
money. The production function f{k,wP) is strictly increasing and strictly 
concave in its arguments and the production inputs are complementary to 
each other, namely, 
fi > 0, /2 > 0，fn < 0, /22 < 0，/11/22 - f?2 > 0 and fu > 0. (3.3) 
Following Rotemberg (1982)，we assume that households face convex costs of 
adjusting prices.^ Specifically, the household-firm's lifetime utility is given 
by 
[ e - l o g c + l ogm叩 - i(芸 -TT*” ] (3.4) 
where c denotes consumption and tt* is steady-state inflation rate. House-
holds dislike having their price grow at a rate different from tt*, which brings 
•2This restriction imposed on d{-) is necessary for the firm's problem to be well defined 
ill a symmetric equilibrium. 
•'This form of nominal price rigidity is also adopted by Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe and 
Uribe (2001a,b) and Dupor (2001). 
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about the cost of nominal price adjustment in the utility function. 
The law of motion of capital is 
k = i - Sk (3.5) 
where k, i and 5 denote capital owned by the firm, physical investment and 
depreciation rate respectively. And the non-capital wealth s evolves as 
s = {R- 7t)S - R(jn邓 + mP) + ^y - rtz + rk — i - c-T (3.6) 
where R is the nominal interest rate paid on bonds, and r denotes real factor 
price. 
The household-firm chooses time paths for c, s, i, m, /c, k, F, and y 
subject to Eqs. (3.1) (3.2) (3.5) and (3.6), taken as given sq, /cq, and Pq. 
The current-value Hamiltonian is 
� p . A 1 
+ A (R-'k)s- + mP) + ^/(/c, m^) -rk + rk-i-c-r 
where r], fi and A denote the Lagrangian multipliers. 
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The optimality conditions are given by 
A = - (3.7) c 
XR=— (3.8) mPP \ ‘ 
= A (3.9) 
rp 1 
A^ /i = A •pfi _r (3.10) 
77 = A (3.11) 
fj = pTj s^ Sr] — rX (3.12) 
A = A [p + TT - i?] (3.13) 
X j f i k m n + ^tjy'd'ij) = jpin - TT*) — 7介 （3.14) 
together with the transversality condition and the law of motion for k and s. 
In addition, goods market equilibrium yields 
k = -5k-c (3.15) 
44 
Government 
The monetary authority sets the nominal interest rate as a function of 
current inflation rate 
R = ^(tt) (3.16) 
where 於 ) i s non-decreasing, strictly positive and differentiable. We assume 
there exists at least one tt* such that ip{7r*) = p + tt*. The monetary policy 
is said to be active when ip'i'^*) > 1 and passive when ip' (tt*) < 1. 
2.2 Equilibrium Dynamics 
Since real balances are separable in the utility function, Eq. (3.8) only de-
termines the value of m"^ in equilibrium. Therefore, we ignore Eq. (3.8) 
for simplicity. In a symmetric equilibrium, all household-firm units choose 
identical functions for consumption, asset holdings, and prices where k = k, 
P = P and y = y义 Prom Eqs. (3.11) (3.12) and (3.13), we obtain 
R-T^ = r - 6 (3.17) 
Eq. (3.17) is a noarbitrage condition between holding capital and govern-
ment debt. This implies that the capital rental rate must increase when the 
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monetary authority raises the real interest rate on government bond. Eqs. 
(3.9) and (3.10) can be used to solve for m^ as a function of k and tt, that is 
mP = mP(/c,tt), where 
(9mP _ ipfn 7 r ) / 2 i � ^ 
dmP _ i^'h - - l)/2 ^ . 
Prom Eq. (3.10) and the above equation about m^, /i can be solved as a 
function of tt, c, and k, that is /.i = By substituting it into the 
Eq. (3.14)，we solve 介 as a function of tt, c, and k. Finally, the system can 
be expressed by a 3 x 3 systems in terms of tt, c, and k 
介 = _ _ 丄[1 + 利 + (3.20) 
ic jcfi 
c = c [ip^ir) — p — tt] (3.21) 
k = f{k, mP{k, tt)) -5k-c (3.22) 
where (f) = d'{l) < —1，denotes the equilibrium price elasticity of the demand 
function faced by the individual firm. In addition, we denote z = (})/4>+l > 1 
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to facilitate further calculation. 
Letting x = x — x*,we linearize Eqs. (3.20) (3.21) and (3.22) around the 
neighborhood of the steady state (tt*，c*’ fc*). The system can be summarized 
as follows 
TT Zi 0 Is TT 
c = gi 0 0 c 
• A 
k hi 一 1 /i3 k 
_ � L � L � 
We denote A as the Jacobian matrix on the right-hand side. The elements 
of A are given by 
“ = P + … � , ( 功 ' _ 1) _ m (3.23) 
7cVr [{p + 棚 2 -iP + ^ )/l2l 
. - a + 4 > ) i P + s ) r [f^rn-ifuf] _ 
9i = c* Win*) - 1] (3.25) 
h = f f - ^ < 0 (3.26) 
f)rnP 
h, = zlp + 6 ] - S + f ; — > 0 (3.27) 
Note that the expression of Eq. (3.23) is complicated. An important 
equation (p + 6)f2 - pfi = 0 is used to facilitate the algebra calculation, 
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which can be obtained from dividing Eq. (3.9) with Eq. (3.10). The trace 
and the determinant of the Jacobian matrix are given by 
det{A) = -giH (3.28) . 
trace{A) = ii + /13 ^ 0 (3.29) 
From our assumption of the production function, we notice that 23 is neg-
ative since f 11/22 — f 'u > 0. And the sign of gi only depends on the choice 
of the interest rate rules. It is easy to obtain det{A) < 0 for passive interest 
rate rules and det{A) > 0 for active interest rate rules. However, trace(A) is 
too complicated to make a definite judgement about whether it is positive or 
negative. The equilibrium dynamics can be explained as follows. For pas-
sive interest rate rules, if trace(A) < 0，the economy is either determinate or 
indeterminate; if trace{A) > 0, equilibrium determinacy will be guaranteed. 
For active interest rate rules, if trace{A) < 0, there is equilibrium indeter-
minacy; if trace(A) > 0，there is either indeterminacy or non-solution. We 
formally state these results in the following two propositions. 
PROPOSITION 3.1 For passive monetary policy where 妙'(tt*) < 1, 
(a) if trace(A) < 0, we either have three characteristic roots with negative 
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real part or one characteristic root with negative real part and two roots with 
positive real part. So there is a unique or a continuum of perfect-foresight 
equilibria in which all the variables converge to the steady state. 
(b) if trace(A) > 0, we have one characteristic root with negative real part 
and two roots with positive real part. Consequently, there exists a unique 
perfect foresight equilibrium in which (TT, C, k) converges asymptotically to 
the steady state (7r*，c*，/c*). 
We draw different conclusions regarding equilibrium analysis under pas-
sive monetary policy. Note that for the sticky-price model studied in Dupor 
(2001), passive monetary policy ensures equilibrium uniqueness. In our 
presented model where money plays a role in production function, passive 
monetary policy brings about equilibrium indeterminacy. How can this hap-
pen? One direct reason is that there exists a negative trace{A), which is 
due to an ambiguous partial derivative of tt with respect to tt given by ii. 
On the contrary, in Dupor (2001), this derivative is unambiguously positive 
in case of passive monetary policy. If the partial derivative was also positive 
in our productive-money model, i.e., ii > 0, trace{A) would be definitely 
positive and the same results would be obtained as Dupor (2001). All in all, 
our introduction of money into the production function is at the heart of the 
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problem.4 The following proposition summarizes the case of active interest 
rate rules. 
PROPOSITION 3.2 For active monetary policy where 妙[TT” > 1, 
(a) if trace(A) < 0，we have one characteristic root with positive real 
part and two roots with negative real part. So there is a continuum of 
perfect-foresight equilibria in which all the variables converge to the steady-
state. 
(b) if trace(A) > 0, we either have three characteristic roots with positive 
real part or one characteristic root with positive real part and two character-
istic roots with negative real part. Consequently, either a continuum of PFE 
or no PFE exists in which (TT, C, k) converges asymptotically to the steady 
state. 
3 Endogenous Labor Supply 
In this section, we consider an extended model that includes endogenous 
leisure choice. Dupor (2001) investigates the case for separable leisure, 
and its results also hold for the case with inelastic labor supply. Further 
'Similar results with respect to this point can also be found in Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe 
and Uribe (2001a). Please refer to their paper for more elaborate explanations. 
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study is to investigate the preference specification with non-separable leisure. 
If leisure is not separable, monetary policy may have significant effects on 
production through its influence on labor supply. Farmer (1997) and Meng 
and Yip (2003) attach much importance to the non-separable leisure case. 
Farmer (1997) shows that equilibrium indeterminacy can arise for the interest 
rate pegging policy. Meng and Yip (2003) extends Farmer's work to interest 
rate feedback rules and demonstrates that equilibrium indeterminacy can 
arise for both active and passive monetary policy. Unlike previous research, 
we study the non-separable leisure case with nominal rigidities. 
Following Farmer (1997), the household-firm's lifetime utility is given by 
厂 e - 辦 [ f - 爪 一 a〉l，x》0 (3.30) 
Jo 1-0- 2 尸 
The household-firm is also subject to the following constraints 
y = = = (3.31) 
k = i-6k (3.32) 
s = {R- 7T)S - Rm + ； y - wn - rkwn-{-rk - i — c —T (3.33) 
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where n denotes the labor hired by the household-firm, w is the real wage 
rate, and a + 卢=1. 
The current-value Hamiltonian function is given by 
H = ^ ^ - - - 7r*)2 + 7/(2 - 5k) + W'^di^) - k^fi^ 
1 一 (7 2 r P 
� P 1 
Q A 
+ A {R — 7r)s — Rm + — wn — rk + wn + rk — i — c 一丁 
Solving the household-firm's optimization problem, we obtain the following 
optimality conditions 
A = c-"^  (3.34) 
(a - l)m-、i+x = RX (3.35) 
(l + X)mi—、x = u;;V (3.36) 
r p ‘ 
= A w - 予iSiefi" (3.37) 
� p • 
= X r - (3.38) 
r] = X (3.39) 
力 = p " + (J77 - r A (3.40) 
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X = X[p-\-7r-R] (3.41) 
A^fc^n^ + 二 7/^ (7r - TT*) — 7亓 （3.42) 
together with the transversality condition and the law of motion for k and s. 
The resource constraint is given by 
k = / c � " — 5k-c (3.43) 
A 
Consider symmetric equilibria where k = k,n = n,P = P and y = Y^. 
The no-arbitrage condition that R -{- 5 — n = r also stands as the model 
presented in Section 2. Prom Eqs. (3.36) (3.37) and (3.38)，m can be solved 
as a function of k and tt, i.e., m = m(/c,7r). By substituting m into Eq. 
(3.36), n can be expressed as a function of tt, C, and k, i.e., n = n(c, A;,7r) 
where 
〜 = 1 1 ^ 〉 。 （3.45) 
n �(l-a)V/ I aW-1)] ,,... 
Finally, the dynamic system boils down to the following 3 differential equa-
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tions in terms of TT, C, and k. 
介 =•一 力 _ 崎 + 利 + _ + “ ) (3.47) 
c = ^ [辦 TT) - P-'K] (3.48) 
k = /c"?/ -5k-c (3.49) 
Letting x = x — x*, we linearize the above three equations around the 
steady state 
TT II 22 IS N 
C — GI 0 0 C 
• A 
k hi /i2 hs k 
The elements of the Jacobian matrix A are listed as follows 
Z2 = - B ^ < 0 (3.51) 
n* 
13 = B- B化 (3.52) 
n* 
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= ^ Wiir*) - 1] (3.53) 
A;* 
hi = C—n^ (3.54) n* ^ ‘ 
/c* 
H2 = C—Tic — 1 (3.55) 
n* \ ‘ 
whereB = M ^ < 0 ， C = ^ i M � 0 . 
0:7 [c*) a 
The determinant of the Jacobian matrix is given by det(A) = —GIB. 
Since B is negative, the sing of det(A) is solely determined by the degree of 
activeness of monetary policy. Note that for iJj\7T*) < (>) 1，det(A) < (>) 
0. Similar to the case of productive money, the trace{A) is indefinite in 
sign due to the ambiguous partial derivative of 介 with respect to tt given by 
ii. This is caused by our assumption about the non-separable leisure-labor 
choice. If leisure is non-separable, monetary policy has significant effects on 
production through its influence on labor supply. To sum up, for passive 
interest rate rules, there is either equilibrium uniqueness or indeterminacy; 
for active interest rate rules, there is either indeterminacy of equilibrium or 
no equilibrium. These results coincide with what we have obtained in Section 
2. Our analysis of these two models verifies that the way in which money 
enters preference and technology plays a decisive role in dynamic analysis 
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4 Conclusion 
In this essay, we have incorporated neoclassical investment in a benchmark 
imperfect competition-sticky price model. From the previous two essays, we 
conclude the presence of endogenous investment stabilizes the economy by-
giving rise to equilibrium uniqueness for active monetary policy. But this 
may not always be the case. For an economy with nominal price rigidity, the 
introduction of endogenous investment generates quite opposite results. By 
examining two alternative monetary models, we have found that equilibrium 
uniqueness varnishes for active interest rules and equilibrium indeterminacy 
arises for both active and passive interest rate rules.^  
This essay also provides a contrast between flexible price models and 
sticky price models. Note that our choice of the utility functions and the 
economic environment has strict comparability with Meng and Yip (2003). 
One distinct difference is whether the economy is in perfect competition or in 
imperfect competition. It is quite interesting to find that for passive interest 
rate rules, these two kinds of competition make no difference on the dynamics 
of the economy. That means for the same preference and technology, the 
5According to Dupor (2001), for a basic MIUF model where utility function is loga-
rithmic in money and consumption, equilibrium indeterminate can only arise under active 
interest rules. 
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choice of flexible price models or sticky price models has no effect on their 
equilibrium analysis. However, they do make differences for active interest 
rate rules. In our sticky price models, equilibrium uniqueness could not be 
reached under active monetary policy while it is obtainable for flexible price 
models. 
Our analysis is restricted to the simplified interest rate rules where mon-
etary authority sets the nominal interest rate as the function of the inflation 
rate. Nevertheless, it is favorable to consider alternative interest rate rules 
with output gap. Finally, we should point out that all the research is based 
on the local dynamic analysis. Our findings are not robust to global analysis 
which may be quite different from local analysis. 
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